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A network of bilateral treaties and other international investment agreements (IIAs) has 
constructed a predictable and enforceable international investment regime. 
 
Since 1992, however, the protections offered by this regime have potentially been limited 
by the inclusion in IIAs of self-judging essential security interest (ESI) clauses. These 
clauses expressly allow a government to take measures—unilaterally—that “it considers 
necessary”1 to evade treaty obligations. 
 
This Perspective presents a study of 1,861 IIAs concluded by 90 countries before early 
2016.
2
 The study sought to identify the geographic and temporal spread of self-judging 
ESI clauses in IIAs and trends in drafting styles. It found 222 IIAs containing self-
judging ESI clauses, with the United States (US) being the first to introduce them. The 
US, Canada and Japan remain the leading users, followed by a growing number of Asian 
and Latin American countries. 
 
While the number of self-judging ESI clauses is small compared to the total number of 
IIAs, the proportion of IIAs with such clauses concluded in a given year has increased 
from negligible in 2000 to over 60% of IIAs concluded in 2015. (See charts below.) By 
early 2016, at least 134 countries, accounting for 99% of world outward FDI flows and 
stock, were bound by such clauses. 
 




 “Broad clauses” (127 IIAs) refer to “essential security interests” without further 
definition or limitation, giving governments wide discretion to determine what 
2 
constitutes their ESI. For example: “Nothing in this Agreement … preclude[s] a 
Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for … the protection of 
its own [ESI].”3 
 “Narrow clauses” (95 IIAs) limit self-judgment to specific subjects, typically 
related to furnishing certain information, but also to matters such as war or other 
emergencies. Occasionally, narrow clauses incorporate, by reference, or replicate, 




 “Very strong clauses” (15 IIAs) include a footnote prescribing that arbitral 
tribunals must respect a government’s determination of its ESI: “For greater 
certainty, if a Party invokes [ESI] … the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall 
find that the exception applies.”4 
 “Strong clauses” (190 IIAs) state simply that they are self-judging. 
 “Conditional clauses” (17 IIAs) subject self-judgment to a requirement that 
measures are not applied, for example, in an arbitrary or unjustifiably 
discriminatory manner, or so as to avoid treaty obligations.
5
 This leaves the door 
open for arbitral review
6
 (which can be explicitly required
7
), especially when 
treaties require reasons for invoking the exception. 
 
The most far-reaching clauses, conferring maximum discretion on governments to 
determine their own compliance with treaty obligations, are “broad” and “very strong.” 
Ten IIAs containing such clauses were identified, followed by 102 with broad/strong 
clauses and 88 with narrow/strong clauses. 
 
Except perhaps when clauses are “very strong,” most self-judging clauses could arguably 
be challenged on the basis of “good faith.”8 Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals must give 




Overall, the proliferation of self-judging ESI clauses makes IIA protections uncertain, 
subordinating treaty disciplines to governments’ self-restraint. They are likely to spread 
further, as governments seek to protect ESI concerns and regulatory sovereignty, and 
could extend beyond security to cover financial and other regulation. Broad/strong self-
judging ESI clauses are quite sweeping, creating the risk of abuses by governments. 
 
Abuses could perhaps be limited by more narrow definitions of “essential security 
interests” and clearer delineations of when exceptions can be invoked (for example, 
limiting them solely to national security concerns, and/or expressly providing that they 
cannot apply to broader interests and economic issues); explicitly stipulating “good-faith” 
requirements; incorporating a last-resort condition; requiring notification or prior reasons 
given to a joint committee; and/or providing for consultations with treaty counterparties 
before invoking an ESI clause. Ultimately, however, the clauses remain self-judging. 
 
3 
Although the trend described in this Perspective might be part of the much-needed 
rebalancing of the investment regime toward greater rights for governments, care must be 
taken not to undermine the rule of international investment law in the process. 
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 Or similar formulations establishing subjective self-judgment. 
2
 The review drew on various databases and direct contacts with countries, but not all countries and IIAs 
were reviewed. 
3
 US-Australia FTA, art. 22.2(b). 
4
 See, e.g., US-Peru FTA, art. 22.2. Whereas the US discontinued use of such a footnote since 2007, other 
countries have not. 
5
 See, e.g., Korea-Japan BIT, art. 16. 
6
 See, e.g., Japan-Mozambique BIT, art. 18. 
7
 See, e.g., China-Peru FTA, art. 141. 
8
 See, e.g., Kenneth Vandevelde, “Of politics and markets: the shifting ideology of the BITs,” International 
Tax & Business Lawyer, vol. 11 (1993), at p. 159; Stephan Schill and Robyn Briese, “‘If the state 
considers’: self-judging clauses in international dispute settlement,” Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, vol. 13 (2009), pp. 61-140. 
9
 Tribunals in investor-state arbitrations have not yet considered self-judging ESI clauses. The effect of 
self-judging provisions in other legal instruments (e.g., ICJ Statute, art. 36(2)) remains uncertain. See, also, 
Interhandel (Switzerland v. US) [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Judgment). 
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Figure 1. Cumulative number of IIAs signed with self-judging ESI clauses,  





Source: UNCTAD IIA database for number of IIAs (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA) and own research. 
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Figure 2. Number of IIAs signed per year and number of IIAs per year with self-judging ESI clauses,  





Source: UNCTAD IIA database for number of IIAs (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA) and own research. 
 
 Figure 3. Percentage of IIAs signed with self-judging ESI clauses, by year,  





Source: UNCTAD IIA database for number of IIAs (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA) and own 
research. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative number of countries with self-judging ESI clauses,  








Table. Self-judging ESI clauses, by scope and strength 
 
 






Broad ESI scope 10 102 15 
Narrow ESI scope 5 88 2 
 
Source: Own research. 
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